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TOWARDS A CORPORATE STATE? SEAN LEMASS AND THE 
REALIGNMENT OF INTEREST GROUPS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 1948-
1964 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the transformation of Irish economic policy formulation from the 
formation of the first inter-party government in 1948 to the breakdown of Ireland’s 
application to join the EEC in 1963. It shows that the influence of trade unions, 
employers’ groups and farmers’ organisations on policy making in the period marked 
the inception of a corporatist style approach to national policy making. This period 
saw a general evolution in the process of the formulation of public policy towards a 
more conscious and overt tripartite set of arrangements. There was a gradual 
maturation of relations between the emerging interest groups and the government in 
the policy realm. The formalisation of these interest groups wherein they played a 
role in the long term policy planning process is emphasised. While their various 
representatives made strenuous efforts to advance their members’ sectional 
interests, all groups were able to take a strikingly dispassionate and long term view 
of the country’s economic prospects. This paper stresses the importance of Sean 
Lemass both in opposition and in government and argues that he was the key player 
in moving the country from a policy of protectionism to one where interdependence 
with other economies was assumed. By pointing out explicitly to the various 
economic actors in the Irish body politic that ideological change was needed in the 
formulation of economic policy, the Fianna Fail government of 1957-1961 was able 
to set out a concrete agenda for the development of the Irish economy by the early 
1960s. Export-led industrialisation and economic co-operation with Europe were at 
the heart of theses new methods. Ultimately Irish economic policy formulation had 
moved dramatically in an ideological sense in the fifteen years since 1948: the new 
ideology was a formalised proto corporatist style social democracy which involved all 
the key players collectively in responsible decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The decision of the Fianna Fail government to seek membership of the European 
Economic Community [EEC] in 1961 marked the climax of a transformation in Irish 
economic policy formulation. From 1948 when the first inter-party government took 
office, successive governments were plagued by a series of balance of payments 
crises and a general economic malaise which by the time Fianna Fail regained office 
in 1957 had reached epidemic proportions. It had become painfully obvious within 
the policy making arena that protectionism, in place since 1932, and the country’s 
over reliance on the British market offered no real future for Irish agriculture or 
industry.  
 
Yet this view was not unanimous within or outside the government. Some policy 
makers were reluctant to accept any form of multi-lateral trading arrangements which 
would weaken protected industry and the country’s privileged access to British 
markets. By the end of the 1950s, however, this had become very much a minority 
view associated mainly with the Department of Industry and Commerce and sections 
of a number of interest groups, most notably parts of the trade union movement and 
segments of the protected industrial sector. The process by  which Ireland moved 
from a protected economy to one in which interdependence with other economies 
was assumed was one in which interest groups participated fully. By the time of the 
failure of the first application to join the EEC in 1963, economic actors, whether 
state, political or interest group realised that Ireland’s economic future could not 
prosper in economic isolation. They were active partners with government in 
pursuing an aggressive agenda for economic growth. Fundamentally it was the 
government not the market which brought these actors into the process and it was 
the government in both its political and administrative forms which gave the lead in 
promoting new economic strategies. By pointing out explicitly to the various 
economic actors in the Irish body politic these new approaches, the government was 
able to set out a concrete agenda for the development of the economy by the early 
1960s.  Export-led industrialisation and economic co-operation with Europe were at 
the heart of these new methods. 
 
A CHANGE IN POLICY FORMULATION 
How and why did Lemass bring this interest groups with him in this journey towards 
free trade? The course of Irish economic policy formulation between 1948 and 1964 
was determined largely by the political instability which plagued successive 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 23 
3 
governments throughout the period. This instability can be put down to voter 
disenchantment with the economy. The elections of 1951, 1954 and 1957 were 
fought principally on economic issues. While there were differing viewpoints within 
both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael on the course economic policy should take, voters 
inevitably blamed the party in government for the stagnation in the economy. De 
Valera, although not a firm supporter, in any sense, of the new financial thinking 
which had taken root in the Department of Finance with the appointment of T.K. 
Whitaker as Secretary in 1956, nevertheless realised that old remedies had not 
helped Fianna Fail politically. By the time Fianna Fail had lost power for the second 
time in six years in 1954, de Valera was remote from much of the debate raging 
within the party and the country at large. He was, however, politically astute enough 
to know that economic retrenchment as associated with Fianna Fail when they went 
to the country in 1948 and 1954 had been rejected by the electorate. Fine Gael, for 
their part, were equally as divided. In such circumstances the original dynamic for 
change in the Irish economy came from two sources: factions within the main 
political parties, and within the civil service. Within this governmental arena financial 
ideology reared its head. Supporters of both an activist approach and of the 
traditional retrenchment approach to economic policy existed in both camps and the 
story of  the development of economic policy in this era was one of a struggle fought 
out between these two groups at a number of levels. 
 
The introduction of Keynesian economic policies by the first inter-party government 
in 1948 was the first concrete change in economic policy for a generation (Fanning, 
1978; Lynch, 1969) .  It had its dynamic within both administrative and political 
frameworks. The driving force behind the introduction of this policy lay in the political 
field. Patrick McGilligan, James Dillon and Sean MacBride all propagated a change 
in the prevailing financial ideology within which Irish governments pursued policy.1 
On the opposite side of the political fence Sean Lemass, who was involved in a long 
running battle with Sean MacEntee as to the course Fianna Fail should take in 
economic policy, can be said in theory to have supported this departure, though in 
the tribal nature of Irish political discourse he opposed most of that government’s 
economic and industrial policy, the creation of the Industrial Development Authority  
being a notable example. The first inter-party government saw some intrinsic 
opposition to this about turn in economic policy from within the civil service. Both the 
Central Bank and the Department of Finance took the view that such Keynesian 
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policies would bankrupt the nation. Yet within the civil service, some key individuals 
most notably the young Patrick Lynch, who had been seconded from the Department 
of Finance to act as John A. Costello’s personal economic advisor, were avid 
enthusiasts of a Keynesian agenda. A new generation of civil servants who were 
advancing up the administrative ladder were looking farther afield in their quest to 
develop the Irish economy.  Men like Lynch, T.K. Whitaker, J.C. Nagle, Charles 
Murray, Tom Barrington and Tadhg O’Cearbhaill interested themselves in the 
economic workings of other states and took on wider tasks than those traditionally 
associated with the Irish civil service.2 Whitaker, for instance, though a staunch 
defender of traditional Finance thinking during the first inter-party government, 
actively studied economic policy formulation in other countries and used this wider 
experience once he eventually became Secretary in 1956. The first inter-party 
government can be seen as a prime example of the primacy of politics over 
economics within a government framework as the hegemony of Finance and the 
Central Bank was to some extent dissipated by the active political leadership of 
some government departments.  
 
DIFFERENCES WITHIN FIANNA FAIL 
The administrative side of government regained control once Fianna Fail resumed 
office in 1951. The appointment of MacEntee to Finance was the signal for the 
department to reassert itself in the wake of McGilligan’s path breaking stewardship. 
This reassertion must be viewed, however, in  terms of Finance stressing the age old 
solutions for economic problems that were associated with that department since the 
early 1920s. MacEntee was a classic deflationist. He was a firm believer in the 
market and abhorred the Keynesian policies of his predecessor. With J.J. McElligott  
who had been Secretary of Finance since 1927, MacEntee set about placing 
financial policy back on the straight and narrow path of deflationary virtue (Lee, 
1989, p. 324). Fine Gael, back in opposition, lost their collective nerve leaving it to 
the Lemass wing of Fianna Fail to provide the active opposition to such traditional 
thinking. The minutes of the Fianna Fail parliamentary party show quite clearly how 
wide this dispute was. Lemass could not afford to leave MacEntee with a clear run 
and control of economic policy: There was no guarantee that he would automatically 
replace de Valera once ‘the chief’ retired.  
                                                                                                                                                        
1
  McGilligan was Minister for Finance, Dillon Minister for Agriculture and MacBride Minister for 
External Affairs in the first inter-party government. 
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Lemass could not leave the economic assert itself over the political within the 
administrative framework of government at this time. Thus his disputes with 
MacEntee over the whole thrust of economic policy can be seen in these terms. One 
such dispute erupted in late 1952 when Deputy Michael Moran urged that ‘a special 
meeting be held in the near future for a full discussion of Government policy’.  A 
meeting of the full Fianna Fail parliamentary party in January 1953 was consequently 
devoted entirely to economic policy. During the course of the discussion de Valera 
explained that the policy of the party was ‘to pay its way and that any additional 
services called for by the people could only be paid for by taxation’ and stressed that 
‘increased production - principally from the land - was the remedy for most of our 
problems’. While this was traditional Fianna Fail policy it did not satisfy all within the 
party, and within six months a motion sponsored by twenty deputies was put before 
the parliamentary party declaring: 
 
The party is of the opinion that in present 
circumstances a policy of financial austerity is no 
longer justified and requests the government to frame a 
progressive policy suited to the altered situation, with a 
view especially to putting an end to the undue 
restriction of credit by the banks, and making low 
interest loans available for farmers and house 
purchasers.3 
 
The debate which followed this motion lasted through July and when no decision was 
reached was then postponed until after the summer recess. The topic, however, was 
not discussed again until January 1954. The minutes of this particular meeting are 
brief simply declaring that 
 
after a number of teachtai had contributed to the 
debate, the acting minister for Finance, Prionsias 
MacAogain [Frank Aiken], replied and An Taoiseach 
made a comprehensive statement on the party’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
2
  Both Whitaker and Murray became Secretary of the Department of Finance, Nagle became Secretary 
of the Department of Agriculture, O’Cearbhaill became Secretary of the Department of Labour and 
Barrington became the first director of the Institute of Public Administration. 
3
  Fianna Fail, Parliamentary Party Minutes, 441/A, 22 July 1953. 
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financial and economic policy, Deputy Carter withdrew 
the motion on behalf of the teachtai who signed it.4 
 
There is no further record in the Fianna Fail parliamentary party minutes dealing with 
economic policy until January 1957, by which time the second inter-party government 
had almost run its course. The attempts by some deputies to place government 
economic policy on an expansive footing did not succeed as financial policy 
continued to be restrictive notwithstanding the launching of a  national development 
fund for capital projects in 1953. Despite this scheme Fianna Fail would go to the 
country in 1954 defending a strictly conservative economic record. The result was to 
be a second spell in opposition within three years as they lost four seats in the 
general election and saw John A. Costello form a new administration. When Fianna 
Fail regained office in 1957, de Valera, crucially, relegated MacEntee from Finance. 
In essence this left Lemass with the scope to reshape economic relations in the way 
he wanted. This was principally due to the electoral fortunes of Fianna Fail, and not 
to any great shift in financial ideology. De Valera, although he can have had little 
stomach for it himself, undoubtedly realised that in the electorally fluid 1950s, 
economic expansion could well mean political success. 
 
TOWARDS THE CORPORATE STATE 
It is within these parameters that one can see Lemass’s courtship of the various 
economic interest groups in the period. He instinctively knew that the development of 
the country in economic terms necessarily revolved around a corporatist style 
arrangement with the government leading these groups in a new economic 
partnership. For that to happen, Lemass realised that government in its political form 
would have to be the hegemonic player in the administrative system. Of even more 
importance was that he be at the head of such a system, and for that to happen he 
would have to devise a long term economic strategy that would return Fianna Fail to 
government. While he bemoaned the fact that civil servants did not do enough 
independent thinking, he was firmly of the belief that it was political government 
which should lead. It is in these terms that one can see the evolution in the process 
of the formulation of public policy towards a more conscious and overtly corporatist 
set of arrangements. Within these parameters, the political interests, particularly in 
the form of Lemass, would lead, but it was intrinsic that individual interest groups 
play a full and active role. Thus the formalisation of the identities of the major interest 
                                                     
4
  ibid, 27 Jan. 1954. 
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groups - farmers; business; and trade unions - began (Murphy, 1996). Moreover 
aspects of the civil service became more active as the 1950s continued. Ultimately 
Whitaker’s Economic Development  (1958) was the culmination of a major strand of 
activism within parts of the higher echelons of the civil service. A decade earlier there 
had not been anyone saying that civil servants had a long term policy planning role in 
economic and social affairs. While it is true that many decision makers in the civil 
service were happy to take a back seat and perform their tasks as they had always 
done, there was a vigorous band within administrative circles who believed that it 
was not just the job of the senior civil servant to advise, but it was also imperative 
that they do some independent thinking which could then be presented to their 
political masters. Although the period of the second inter-party government was a 
time when traditional economy was in the ascendant as the policies pursued by that 
government mirrored the previous administration, once Fianna Fail regained power 
in 1957 the civil service, or more correctly some sections of it, should be seen as an 
acknowledged part of any tripartite arrangement between Lemass and the various 
economic partners (Lalor, 1996). 
 
There was a gradual maturation of relations between the emerging interest groups 
and the government in the policy realm during this period. Relations between both 
the second inter-party government and the Fianna Fail government which succeeded 
it, and the National Farmers Association [NFA], had been fraught with difficulty since 
the NFA’s foundation in 1955. This relationship, stormy at the best of times, took on 
an even more acrimonious tone once the abrasive Paddy Smith became Minister for 
Agriculture in 1957. By 1964 the government were in the process of redefining their 
relations with the agricultural lobby. After some nine years of vigorous lobbying the 
NFA were to receive formal recognition, as the government declared that in future 
they would welcome regular and full discussions and consultations with them in the 
formulation of government policy, both broad and specific. For Paddy Smith the 
government’s difficulty had been in finding a  
 
basis for fruitful co-operation while the NFA reserve the 
right to be destructively critical of every move made by 
me to help farmers, and to use meetings with me and 
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my officials as the basis of biased attacks on us and on 
government policy.5   
 
He thus considered that the government might as well be dealing with the NFA on a 
formal footing in the future. He was of the opinion that a well organised farmers’ 
organisation had a really valuable job to do and that it was in his own interests to 
work with them and give a fair hearing to any proposal of a constructive nature that 
they might put before him. Thus in the Dail on 16 February 1964 Lemass gave 
official recognition to the NFA: 
 
We recognise that the NFA has a special status among 
farmers organisations insofar as it is interested in all 
branches of agriculture and we made it clear to them 
that we welcome the prospect of regular 
comprehensive consultations and discussions with 
them in connection with the formulation of agricultural 
policies in the broad sense as well as their practical co-
operation in respect of the different aspects of 
agriculture. This special status will be taken into 
account by us in appointing farmers’ representatives on 
boards and so on.6 
 
While the NFA received formal government recognition, Smith was disturbed at the 
whole thrust of Lemass’s economic policies. After Lemass took over as Taoiseach in 
1959, Smith found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to Lemass’s 
economic and social viewpoints (Robins, 1993, p151).  Lemass’s co-opting of the 
farmers into a formal negotiating relationship with the government was mirrored in 
his attitude to the unions. Smith, however, saw the courting of the unions as 
sacrificing rural to urban interests. While one can see both Lemass’s courting of the 
unions and his formalising of  relations with the NFA as the beginnings of a 
corporatist-style approach to government in the early 1960s, in that a formal political 
structure was put in place which integrated the NFA and Congress as socio-
economic groups through a system of representation with the government, the 
farmers’ organisations and the farming community in general were extremely wary of 
                                                     
5
  N[ational] A[rchives], D[epartment of the] T[aoiseach], S.17543A/63, Smith to Lemass, 20 Nov. 
1963. 
6
  Dail Debates, vol. 206, col. 1794, 16 Feb. 1964. 
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Lemass. The farming lobby’s disappointment at losing out on the enlarged market of 
the EEC  made them only more determined to advance their cause by any means 
possible. The government, notwithstanding the fact that  the relationship had been 
formalised, continued to find it difficult to maintain harmonious relations with the 
farming bodies. An increase in government subventions in 1963, such that the cost 
of these agricultural supports to the taxpayer for the first time exceeded £40 million, 
did not satisfy the NFA. Moreover they proclaimed that the increase was entirely due 
to them. Lemass echoed the frustrations of the government: 
 
Notwithstanding the dimensions of this support to 
agriculture, notwithstanding the substantial increase in 
the volume of this support in recent years, the 
Government were getting very little thanks from the 
professional spokesmen of farmers’ organisations. I 
want to make it clear that we are not looking for thanks 
... But I want to say that I, and all members of the 
Government party, are becoming increasingly fed up 
with the constant propaganda which is being circulated 
amongst farmers that these provisions were made, this 
assistance given, and these new schemes of 
agriculture devised not because we wanted to do so 
but because we were forced into giving them by reason 
of pressure and agitation. This is not true; it was never 
true and it never will be.7 
 
He also claimed that ordinary farmers in the community had a very lively appreciation 
of what the government had done and was striving to do to improve the situation for 
them.  His quarrel was with the NFA, not ordinary farmers. 
 
Yet there can be little doubt that ordinary farmers looked to their respective 
organisations for leadership and indeed blamed the government for what they saw 
as their increasing difficulties. The NFA was mobilised from the bottom upwards 
(Collins, 1993, p.111). Any improvement in the general position of agriculture would 
be credited to their leadership, not to the government. In essence it was in an 
atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion that state - farmer relations were conducted in 
                                                     
7
  Dail Debates, vol. 206, col. 1218, 12 Dec. 1963. 
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this period, a time when the government was trying to broaden Ireland’s industrial 
base and in which the farming community feared that they would be left behind as 
industry boomed in a rising tide of prosperity. Yet this period also saw the formal 
recognition of the role of farmer organisations in the formulation of policy. It was 
perhaps naive of Lemass to expect that, having invited the farmers to sit at the policy 
table, they should abandon the confrontational style that had in their eyes won them 
that approach. For all their blueshirt antecedents (Manning, 1986), by the early 
1960s the NFA had come to be seen by Fianna Fail ministers as a troublesome but 
essentially apolitical grouping: ten years earlier they would have regarded them 
simply as Fine Gaelers on tractors (Murphy, 1996, p.198). The depoliticisation of 
interest group politics  as seen in the formalisation of relations between the Fianna 
Fail government and the NFA, can be viewed as an example of how far Lemass had 
gone in his attempts to create new political relationships and structures in the Ireland 
of the early 1960s. 
 
While clearly the farmers remained the most overtly selfish and sectional group, 
even they came to take some heed of the ‘national’ as distinct from the purely 
agricultural interest. Moreover the vision articulated by the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions [ICTU] is really quite striking, in that they were able to take a dispassionate 
and long term view of the country’s economic prospects in addition to attempting to 
advance the long term sectional interests of their members. The crucial moment in 
the development of union/ business/ government relations in the period was the 
establishment of the Committee on Industrial Organisation [CIO] in 1961 in which 
Congress and the Federation of Irish Industries [FII] were directly represented. 
Originally Congress was left out and had to demand to be included. Garret 
FitzGerald (1991, p.59), who at this stage was an advisor to the FII, argued that it 
had to work with the government in a general review of economic policy and 
approached Whitaker as to the feasibility of the study. This was truly a radical step 
for business to take. Whitaker readily agreed and FitzGerald maintained that it was 
simply due to an oversight that the unions were omitted: 
 
they proved to be the most constructive partners. 
Indeed, insofar as tensions existed within the 
committee they proved - as I had anticipated - to be 
between the Department of Industry and Commerce on 
the one hand and the rest of us, with Finance, the CII 
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and ICTU endeavouring as a troika to nudge that 
department into psychological acceptance of free trade. 
 
When the CIO reports began to appear in the autumn of 1962 they showed the 
weakness of Irish industry, especially when it came to export potential. Not all 
industrialists were in favour of entry to the EEC. One was Aodogan O’Rahilly, a 
successful businessman who was involved in the production of roofing tiles and 
became chairman of Bord na Mona in 1959. Although a close associate of Lemass, 
he  was deeply worried: 
 
while I welcomed foreign investment, I believed that if 
we were going to enter the EEC then our sovereignty 
would be lost and in a free trade environment we would 
quickly go under. I drew comparisons between entry to 
the EEC and the passing of the Act of Union as I 
foresaw Irish industry dying, just as what happened in 
the early 1800s due to the operation of economic laws. 
In many ways I suppose I was an old style Fianna Fail 
nationalist.8 
 
More typical, however, was the response of Jack Fitzpatrick of the FII who told 
Hibernia that Ireland would join the EEC and the result would be the ‘blossoming of 
our economy’.9 Officially the FII had become a supporter of Whitaker’s policy of 
economic planning. It noted in its official journal that  
 
in the midst of the activities in preparing for entry into 
the EEC it is good to see that the Government have not 
lost sight of their economic planning programme which 
will have an important bearing on our preparedness  to 
face the challenge of the common market.10 
 
The CIO was part of a continuing corporatist-style initiative by Lemass to involve the 
unions and industry in the policy of economic development in that it saw the 
development of a political structure which organised the socio-economic groups 
                                                     
8
  Author’s interview with Aodogan O’Rahilly, 14 May 1994. 
9
  Fitzpatrick is quoted in Hibernia, Mar. 1962. 
10
  Industrial Review, The Journal of the Federation of Irish Industries, vol. 18, No. 5, Sept - Oct. 1961. 
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through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the 
leadership level and social control at the mass level. Moreover Lemass’s desire to 
incorporate the unions found an echo in the dominant trend of corporatist thinking 
within the trade union movement itself (Hutton, 1991, p.63). The Employer-Labour 
conference came into existence in 1962 and the National Industrial and Economic 
Council [NIEC] was established a year later. These new agencies paralleled the 
state’s commitment to economic planning, although if Ireland had succeeded in 
gaining entry to the EEC in 1963 it is doubtful what impact they would have 
subsequently had in policy formulation (Girvin, 1994, p.127). The unions did play a 
positive role in bodies such as the CIO and the NIEC with both Donal Nevin (1995) 
and John Carroll (1996), former General Secretaries of ICTU and the Irish Transport 
and General Workers Union [ITGWU] respectively arguing that they could have 
taken the attitude that ‘it is none of our business, but instead played a positive role’.  
Although Congress only gave lukewarm support to the original EEC application they 
offered no dissension to Lemass’s strategy when they met him in January 1962. 
Lemass urged them to accept that changes were underway in Ireland’s relationship 
with the wider world and that existing preferential arrangements with Britain were 
already weakened. He reiterated his intention to seek membership under the best 
terms possible, but said that they would have to operate on the assumption that 
tariffs would have to be removed by the beginning of 1970.  He stressed that it was 
his view that 
 
state aids to industry designed to promote efficiency 
should be regarded as desirable ... though the form of 
aid in some cases would be modified ... In general it 
appeared likely that the question of adjustment to 
common market conditions would be a problem of the 
position of individual firms rather than industrial 
groups.11 
 
This implied that even in the absence of EEC membership considerable changes in 
the Irish economy would be necessary. 
 
 
                                                     
11
  NA, DT, S.17120A/62, Meeting between the Taoiseach, the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, 11 Jan. 1962. 
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DEVELOPING A FREE TRADE ETHOS 
In essence by the early 1960s the government had decided that the future direction 
of the Irish economy lay in it being associated with the EEC. The trade union 
movement were initially lukewarm in their endorsement of this approach but were co-
opted by Lemass and subsequently involved in discussions on the future 
development of economic policy. Wage negotiations overlapped throughout this 
period with the evolution of an external economic stance and the union movement 
recognised that higher wages and higher productivity depended on the expansion of 
the Irish economy. The government, industrial groups and the trade unions 
recognised that industry would have to develop rapidly to meet the rigours of free 
trade competition. As John Conroy, General President of the ITGWU, pointed out at 
the time:  
 
freer trade is coming and unless we all realise this and 
prepare we will find that every workshop and factory 
not fully and efficiently equipped will cease to produce 
to economic requirements and all the employees will 
find themselves unemployed.12 
 
The CIO had pointed out the inadequacies of industry to cope with the transition from 
a protective framework to an interdependent economy. All parties involved 
recognised that there could be no return to a protectionist position and they resolved 
to adopt a trilateral approach in their attempt to revolutionise the Irish economy in the 
light of new free trade conditions. A consensus had emerged that it was better to 
face an unpredictable world as a member of an economic alliance rather than as an 
isolated economy, and an export-led growth initiative was to be adopted. Ireland’s 
economic interests had taken on a wider agenda, one which required the input of  
the farming community, industry and the trade unions. Thus in many ways the 
position of the business leadership was quite similar to that of the unions as the 
debates about entry to Europe gathered pace in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
While there were two distinct views about any proposed entry of a trading bloc within 
the business community as well as the unions, it is clear that they realised that the 
country’s economic fortunes and those of their members were interlinked. 
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  Conroy is quoted in the Irish Press, 10 July 1963. 
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CONCLUSION 
In essence Lemass, from 1957 the undisputed prime economic player in 
government, embarked on a programme to haul the Irish economy out of the dark 
ages of financial austerity, mass emigration and inadequate employment. He did this 
by setting out to establish a broadly European style proto-corporatist social 
democracy, involving all the key players collectively in responsible decision making. 
By the early 1960s most states in Western Europe were actively intervening in the 
economy in order to achieve the economic expansion that their citizens were 
demanding. This was particularly true of the Scandinavian states, although most 
other countries also pursued a consensual approach to economic management in 
this period  (Katzenstein, 1985).  Lemass wanted Ireland to share in the rapid 
economic growth that had been a feature of most European states after the second 
world war.  He had a long range vision for the Irish economy and realised that age 
old methods had not worked in the past and were most unlikely to do so in the future. 
His relations with ICTU and the NFA are clear examples of his attempts to build such 
a social democracy. The emergence of both players as recognised elements in 
national policy making is the crucial sign in Lemass’s attempts to build what we might 
call the broad based church of economic interest groups. It was essential that both 
farmers and unions be involved as well as business. While Lemass’s views did not 
please everyone in Fianna Fail as witnessed particularly by the resignation of Paddy 
Smith as Minister for Agriculture in 1964, the Fianna Fail of the early 1960s was a 
distinctly different party to that which had lost power in 1948. A new generation of 
politicians, influenced greatly by Lemass, were comfortable with the innovative 
direction of economic policy that had Europe as its ultimate goal and left behind 
outmoded theories of self sufficiency.  
 
By the early 1960s Europe was in fact the goal of the majority of politicians and 
interest groups, with even the Catholic Church voicing no overt protest (Cassidy, 
1996). By the time of the application to the EEC in 1961 all the interest groups which 
Lemass had co-opted in his quest to make Ireland a more competitive economy were 
advocates of entry. Policy was to be formulated with these interest groups in mind. 
Thus Lemass resolved that the state would have to show the way. His opportunity 
presented itself out of a national economic malaise and he was determined not to 
waste it. The government of which he was all but nominally in charge from 1957 on 
would pursue policies of economic expansion and would engage with the economic 
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interests to see its aims succeed.  Ultimately it was politics which had reasserted 
itself.  
 
Yet Lemass still faced opposition from his old stomping ground of Industry and 
Commerce. While it was Whitaker who convinced Lemass that free trade had to be 
taken on board, it was Lemass who had to ensure that Industry and Commerce left 
their protectionist mentality behind (Whitaker, 1994). He did this to such an extent 
that by 1963 Industry and Commerce were maintaining that they ‘wholeheartedly’  
supported a phased cut in tariffs.13 While European economic integration was not an 
explicit feature of either Economic Development or the First Programme for 
Economic Expansion (1958), developments within the economic superstructure had 
shown policy makers that they could not exist independently of the free trading blocs 
that had emerged in Europe from the 1950s onwards. This was particularly true once 
Britain decided that she could no longer ignore these developments. Whitaker was 
the main instigator in Ireland’s move towards economic interdependence with 
Western Europe. Lemass took some convincing, but once persuaded, he became 
the most enthusiastic advocate of membership to such a bloc, in Ireland’s case the 
EEC, since Britain had applied to join that body, and used his political power to 
ensure that some of the more reluctant civil service departments supported him. 
Ireland’s economic needs had taken on a new agenda. An activist Taoiseach, 
Lemass, had brought his party with him, and in the process had fundamentally 
changed their economic philosophy. Assisted by dynamic elements within the civil 
service had embarked on a route that assumed interdependence with other 
economies. To secure a consensus on this he engaged in meaningful and formal 
dialogue with economic interest groups. By 1964 the primacy of the political process 
was fully recognised. Civil servants and the economic interests had a vital role to 
play but it was Lemass who was in charge of economic development. 
                                                     
13
  D Finance, F.121/36/63, Department of Industry and Commerce, Memorandum for the government, 
unilateral 10% tariff cut, Nov. 1962. 
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